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According to recent and largely untested theories, unemployment benefits (UBs) could 
improve the extent and quality of job reallocation even at the cost of increasing 
unemployment. Using yearly panel data from a large number of countries, we evaluate 
empirically the relationship between unemployment benefits and structural change. Unlike 
previous work assessing the effects of UBs on labor market stocks, we focus on flows and 
rely on policy "experiments", notably the introduction from scratch of unemployment benefits 
in many countries. We exploit the longitudinal nature of our data to lessen the potentially 
important selection, endogeneity and omitted variables problems. We find a positive, sizable 
and significant effect of the introduction of UBs on job reallocation, arising mainly from the job 
destruction margin although this effect fades away over time. UBs are also found to induce 
more sectoral shifts from agriculture to services. These findings appear to be robust to 
changes in the countries in the sample, control variables or estimation methods. We discuss 
to which extent our results are consistent with equilibrium matching models with or without 
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Empirical studies on the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts (UBs) typically concentrate on the mi-
croeconomic insurance vs. incentives trade-oﬀ. Economic theory predicts that the receipt of un-
employment beneﬁts negatively aﬀects job search intensity and increases the reservation wages of
jobseekers and a large body of applied studies supports the standard prediction that longer dura-
tions of unemployment beneﬁts increase the duration of unemployment. This empirical research
also points to the importance of speciﬁc design features of unemployment beneﬁts, related to eligi-
bility and entitlement criteria, in addition to the level of the beneﬁts. Kiefer (1988), Atkinson and
Micklewright (1991), Krueger and Meyer (2002), as well as Meyer (2005) provide excellent surveys
of this rich and insightful literature.
Much less attention has been devoted to date by applied economists to investigating the macro-
economic, reallocation eﬀects, of unemployment beneﬁt s .T h i si sas e r i o u ss h o r t c o m i n ga san u m b e r
of recent theoretical contributions point to major eﬀects of UBs on job reallocation and labor pro-
ductivity. General equilibrium models of the labor market a la Mortensen and Pissarides (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1994), stochastic job matching models (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999 and 2000; Ma-
rimon and Zilibotti, 1999) suggest that UBs act on both job creation and job destruction margins,
as well as on the quality of job matches, and hence on average productivity. More importantly still,
these models have diﬀerent implications as to the eﬀects of UBs on job creation and destruction,
which could be possibly tested empirically.
Research related to the study of the transition to a market of economies coming from central
planning also contributed to highlight other potentially important eﬀects of unemployment insur-
ance, which had been previously overlooked. As pointed out by Aghion and Blanchard (1994),
there is a negative ﬁscal externality on private job creation associated with the ﬁnancing of UBs,
which may counteract the moderating eﬀects of unemployment on wages, reducing job creation in
the high productivity sector, hence the speed of job reallocation. Contrary to popular wisdom,
formerly planned economies entered the transition with a workforce specialized in very narrowly
deﬁned skills because central planning over-invested in vocational schools (Flanagan, 1993; Boeri,
2000). When such “skill speciﬁcities” are an important source of rents, UBs improve the quality of
job matches by encouraging workers to seek for jobs that are harder to get. Matches are, on average,
more productive when unemployment beneﬁts have a longer duration in this setup. Other work on
formerly planned economies looked at the interactions of unemployment beneﬁts and wage-setting
institutions. Under realistic wage setting mechanisms, more generous UBs strengthen the position
of workers at the bargaining table as they improve their outside option. Even in the absence of
minimum wages or with low and poorly enforced statutory minimum wages (as in most transitional
2economies), ﬂat rate subsidies oﬀered to the unemployed proved to act as a wage ﬂoor, “pricing out”
of the market the least productive jobs. This role of UBs as wage ﬂoors may explain asymmetries
in labor market adjustment trajectories of Central and Eastern European countries vis-à-vis former
Soviet Republics (Boeri, 2000): more employment adjustment in the former group of countries
where UBs were relatively generous and more wage adjustment in Russia, where unemployment
remained for long time surprisingly low in spite of dramatic falls in output.
An important macroeconomic reallocation role is assigned to UBs also by political economy mod-
els. Those addressing the constraints faced by privatization, for instance, pointed to an additional
role of UBs in winning support of workers to outsider privatization and enterprise restructuring
(Dewatripont and Roland, 1994; Blanchard, 1997). Models of political-economic institutional in-
teractions in the labor market (Saint-Paul, 2000) suggest that unemployment beneﬁts reduce the
demand for employment protection legislation (EPL) (Boeri, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2006; Al-
gan and Cahuc, 2007) as both institutions protect workers against uninsurable labor market risk.
"Flexicurity" conﬁgurations with more UBs have less EPL, which hinders job reallocations: UBs
are more "mobility friendly" (Bertola and Boeri, 2002), and can better accommodate large scale
restructuring (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003).
A common thrust of these diﬀerent strands of literature is that UBs, in addition to inﬂuencing
the aggregate level of unemployment, signiﬁcantly aﬀect the scope of job reallocation. Actually,
some variants of these models do not yield clear-cut predictions about the eﬀects of UBs of un-
employment stocks, while they do have unambiguous predictions as to the eﬀects of UBs on job
creation and destruction rates. Moreover, they suggest that there is a slow adjustment of unem-
ployment stocks to the introduction of UBs, while the eﬀects on ﬂows, notably on job destruction,
occur immediately.
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical work has been done to date to test this reallocation
role of unemployment beneﬁts on a multicountry and multiperiod basis. Applied macro studies
generally estimate the responsiveness of aggregate unemployment to UBs (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell,
1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 2005), while neglecting its eﬀects
on job reallocation.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to ﬁlling this gap, by using institutional and labor
market data from a large number of countries around the world for the period 1980-2002. As
pointed out by the microeconometric literature, UBs are multidimensional institutions. This makes
it diﬃcult to properly measure UBs generosity in a multicountry-multiperiod setting. In order to
cope with this problem, we exploit the fact that several countries introduced unemployment beneﬁts
from scratch between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. This empirical strategy
isolates reforms that unambiguously made the UB system more generous than in the past. Our
3outcome variables are meant to test the predictions of this new body of theory on labor market
ﬂows: job creation, job destruction, job turnover and the shares of workers in agriculture (proxying
low-productivity jobs), industry and services.
As we focus on dichotomic policy choices and mainly on within-country variation, we can
proceed without having to rely on the standard one-dimensional measures of UB generosity, and
we do not need to worry about two-tier UB systems. We also concentrate on labor market ﬂows,
which, unlike aggregate stocks, are always sensitive to institutional reforms, even in the short-
run. Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the longitudinal nature of our dataset to lessen
potentially important selection, endogeneity and omitted variables problems. In our regression
models, we include country ﬁxed eﬀects as well as country-speciﬁc time trends. The inclusion of
country ﬁxed eﬀects ensures that we are controlling for omitted time-invariant variables as well as
for selection into adopting unemployment beneﬁts based on the level of job turnover. The model
including country ﬁxed eﬀects and country-speciﬁc time trends is a version of the "random growth"
model used in Ashenfelter and Card (1985), Heckman and Hotz (1989) and more recently in Brown,
Earle and Telegdy (2006). This speciﬁcation allows us to control for potentially diﬀerent trends
in rates of job creation and destruction experienced by particular groups of countries (notably
formerly planned economies) in the period considered, which could have been aﬀecting a country’s
propensity to introduce unemployment beneﬁts.
Our analysis indicates that the introduction of UBs is associated with higher rates of job
turnover. This eﬀect is economically substantial, statistically signiﬁcant and robust to changes
in countries in the sample, control variables or estimation methods. The introduction of unem-
ployment beneﬁts is associated with about a 1.5 percentage point increase in the yearly rate of
job destruction and a 2.7 percentage points increase in job turnover. This implies a positive eﬀect
on job creation as well, but this eﬀect was not found to be statistically signiﬁcant when estimated
separately. Countries which introduced UBs also experienced a decrease in the share of employment
in agriculture of about 3 percentage points a year, and an increase in the services sector share of 3
percentage points a year. The eﬀects on job destruction are initially larger but fade away rapidly
over time. The impact eﬀects are consistent with a wide array of equilibrium matching models,
predicting an impact eﬀect of UBs on job destruction and slow adjustment of job creation margins.
However, these models also imply permanent eﬀects of UBs on job reallocation rates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two surveys the literature on the eﬀects of UBs on job
reallocation and characterizes the various dimensions of UBs which are relevant in aﬀecting labor
market ﬂows and structural change according to this literature, motivating our empirical strategy.
Section three describes the data and the outcome variables in detail, presents some preliminary
descriptive evidence and outlines in detail our empirical strategy. In Section four, we present the
4results of the empirical analysis. Finally, in Section ﬁve we conclude and propose directions for
further research.
2 Unemployment Beneﬁts and Job Reallocation
2.1 Theoretical Predictions
Any simple static model of labor supply predicts that non-labor income increases the reservation
wage of individuals. Supposing for simplicity that workers have no choice over hours, the introduc-
tion of transfers to non-employed individuals involves a shift upward of aggregate labor supply. In
presence of a downward sloping labor demand, at the competitive equilibrium,e m p l o y m e n ti sl o w e r ,
while wages and labor productivity of the marginal worker are higher. Assuming that there is an
exogenous fraction of jobs destroyed each instant, gross job destruction and creation (replacing the
jobs lost to maintain a constant level of employment) decline at the new equilibrium. The job
destruction rate (job destruction over employment) is, by deﬁnition, constant throughout, together
with the job creation rate. Importantly, at the equilibrium, there is no unemployment, since every
person who wishes to work at the ongoing wage can do so. This raises issues as to why UBs exist
in the ﬁrst place and makes the competitive model rather uninteresting in assessing the eﬀects of
UBs on job reallocation.
Equilibrium matching models a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) with endogenous job de-
struction provide a much richer framework to analyze the eﬀects of UBs on job reallocation. They
endogenously generate an equilibrium with unemployment, vacancies, job creation (unemployment
outﬂows) and job destruction (unemployment inﬂows). Jobs are destroyed when their instantaneous
productivity falls below an endogenously determined reservation productivity level, R.J o b s a r e
created via a matching function that generates unemployment outﬂows by allocating jobseekers, u
to vacancies, v at a rate h which is increasing in market tightness θ = v
u. Wage formation is typi-
cally framed as the outcome of an individual bargaining process aimed at sharing the rents induced
by the presence of matching frictions. The solution to this (Nash) bargaining process implies that
wages are increasing in the outside option of the worker and in market tightness. The labor force
is ﬁxed and can be conveniently normalized to one unit, so that employment is simply (1 − u).A t
the long run equilibrium unemployment is constant, hence job creation equals job destruction in
absolute levels.
h(θ) u = λF(R)(1 − u) (1)
where λ is the (exogenous) rate at which jobs are hit by productivity shocks, and F(R) denotes
the probability that productivity falls below the reservation productivity level. This equilibrium
5condition holds also in terms of job creation and job destruction rates, the measures used in our





Market tightness and the reservation productivity are jointly determined by the intersection of
ad o w n w a r ds l o p i n gj o bc r e a t i o n( J C )c u r v ea n da nu p w a r ds l o p i n gj o bd e s t r u c t i o n( J D )c u r v ei n
the R , θ space, as in Figure 1.
The impact eﬀect of the introduction of a UB system is equivalent, in this context, to an
increase in the reservation productivity threshold, R. The economics is that rent sharing in some low
productivity jobs cannot any longer match the value of unemployment, increased by the introduction
of UBs. Hence these low productivity jobs are destroyed. The out-of-the-steady state dynamics is as
follows. Job Destruction jumps immediately to a higher level, as depicted in Figure 2. At the same
time, employees endowed with a higher outside option succeed in extracting a larger share of the
surplus, that is, average wages increase. As the value of jobs for a ﬁrm declines, less vacancies are
created, and gross job creation declines. Since job destruction increases and job creation declines,
unemployment start rising. Given that the number of jobseekers increases, total outﬂows from
unemployment, hence gross job creation (the left-hand-side of equation 1), gradually increases
from its initial fall, approaching job destruction at the new steady state equilibrium. The latter is
depicted as the point B in Figure 1. It involves a higher R, hence a higher job destruction rate by
equation (2). The job creation rate is also larger at the new equilibrium as the unemployment to
employment rate, in the left-hand-side of equation 2 increased. Thus, in Mortensen and Pissarides
model, the impact eﬀect of the introduction of UBs is an increase in job destruction rates and a
decrease in job creation rates. After the initial fall, the job creation rate recovers to equalize job
destruction at the new steady state equilibrium, which features, on average, a higher productivity.
In this class of models, unemployment beneﬁts have a direct eﬀect on job destruction margins,
a n do n l ya ni n d i r e c te ﬀect (via wages) on job creation. Thus, the introduction of a UB system
tend to shift upwards the job destruction schedule without aﬀecting the equilibrium job creation
condition. Direct eﬀects on job creation can be introduced in these models by allowing eﬀective
labor supply to vary. For instance, allowing for endogenous sorting of workers in formal and
informal sectors (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007) — an extension which is well-suited for labor market
conditions in many middle-income income countries — the introduction of UBs induces workers to
move from the uncovered (informal) sector to the covered (formal) sector, generating equilibria
with higher unemployment and higher job creation in the formal sector. The key factor here is
related to the presence of entitlement eﬀects, that is, the presence of a segment of job applicants
who are not currently receiving UBs, but who qualify for beneﬁts only by working in the formal
6sector. The introduction of a UB system increases labor supply in the formal sector and this
mitigates the eﬀects on wages of a higher outside option for those who already work in the formal
sector. Analogous is the case where ﬁrst-time jobseekers or new entrants in the labor market are
not eligible to beneﬁts. The introduction of UBs increases job creation in this group. As there is
an additional, participation, margin to be considered, these extensions may fail to deliver unique
equilibria and cannot be simply characterized in the R,θ space. Yet, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007)
showed that, under some reasonable parameter values, employment in the formal sector increases
after the introduction of UBs. This means that, unlike in the Mortensen and Pissarides model,
the impact eﬀect on job creation can be positive. Job creation, however, unlike job destruction, is
not a jump variable in this class of models. Thus, the adjustment of job creation is more gradual
than the adjustment of job destruction. If employment in the shadow sector is properly measured
by statistics, job creation and destruction rates will be higher at the new long-run equilibrium. If
instead available statistics cover only the formal sector, measured job creation and destruction rates
m a ya c t u a l l yd e c l i n eover time, as soon as the entitlement eﬀect induces shifts from the shadow
sector to the formal sector.
Stochastic job matching models (Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999; Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999 and
2000) allow for the productivity of any match to be revealed to the worker and the ﬁrm only after
the match occurs. In this setting, the introduction of UBs increases average labor productivity
and wages, by inducing equilibria where only high productivity jobs are created, as workers turn
down low productivity jobs from the start. There can be an eﬃciency enhancing role of UBs in this
context as job search continues until a good match is created. The equilibrium with UBs features
higher unemployment than without UBs, as well as less job creation and destruction and longer
duration unemployment as individuals become more choosy in their job search strategies. However,
job creation and destruction rates are larger, due to the decline in employment. Importantly, in
this case the direct eﬀe c ti so nt h ej o bc r e a t i o nm a r g i n .
Summarizing, only the (rather uninteresting) competitive model implies that UBs do not aﬀect
job creation and destruction rates. Equilibrium matching models with ﬁxed labor supply imply that
UBs on the impact increase job destruction rates and decrease job creation rates and that the new
long run equilibrium features higher job ﬂows on both margins. Matching models with entitlement
eﬀects (endogenous participation in employment allowing for entitlement to UBs) imply a positive
eﬀect on both job creation and destruction rates from the start, while stochastic job matching
models imply that the eﬀect of the introduction of UBs is on the job creation margin and is
negative. In the long-run all of these models imply higher rates of job creation and destruction after
the introduction of UBs except in the case where employment in the shadow (no UB entitlement)
economy is poorly measured. If this is the case, then shifts of workers from shadow to legal
7employment may be counted as increases in aggregate employment, reducing both measures of job
reallocation over time.
2.2 Measurement issues
T h ea s s e s s m e n to ft h ee m p i r i c a lr e l e v a n c eo ft h i sl iterature requires drawing on measures of job
reallocation, gross job creation and gross job destruction as well as possibly indicators of the quality
of job reallocation, that is, the eﬀects on the distribution of jobs by productivity levels. We discuss
our preferred measures, in light of data availability constraints, below. Before turning to that, it is
important to address a number of methodological issues related to the measurement of UBs, which
motivate our empirical strategy.
Empirical research often treats unemployment beneﬁts as a one-dimensional institution. How-
ever, there are several key dimensions which identify an unemployment beneﬁt system: the eligibility
conditions, the level of payments, the maximum legal duration and the actual entitlement rules, in
light of activation policies conditioning payments to job search requirements. Mapping all of these
features into a one-dimensional measure is not an easy task and information on all these dimensions
is often not available for all countries and time periods.
Available summary measures of the generosity of UBs can be misleading as they may misreport
actual changes occurred in a UB system. Macroeconomic estimates of the eﬀects of UB systems
on aggregate employment, unemployment and wage equations (e.g., Scarpetta, 1999; Nickell, 1997,
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2002, Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 2005) typically resort to a “summary
measure of beneﬁt generosity” tabulated by OECD and deﬁned as the average of the replacement
rates (the ratio of the beneﬁt to the previous wage) in the ﬁrst two years of unemployment for an
“average production worker” having suﬃciently long seniority to be oﬀered the beneﬁts up to their
maximum duration. Sometimes the product of the r e p l a c e m e n tr a t ea n dt h ec o v e r a g er a t e( t h e
fraction of the unemployed population receiving the beneﬁts) is taken. However, the two features
— replacement rates and coverage rates — are not uncorrelated. Coverage is often endogenous to
replacement rates via take-up incentives and ﬁscal constraints. In middle-income countries, UBs
oﬀer relatively high nominal replacement rates (e.g., 60% of the best earnings in the last year in
Argentina), but are oﬀered for a short period of time and only to a small fraction of the workforce
(workers in small business and in rural areas are not covered, as in China). These asymmetries in
replacement rates and duration of beneﬁts are somewhat less evident, but still present, in OECD
countries. In Southern Europe UBs are relatively generous in terms of replacement rates, but
cover less than 50% of the unemployed whilst the UK and, even more so, the US display scarcely
generous UBs providing almost universal coverage of job losers and involving — when account is
made of means-tested social assistance — unlimited duration.
8UB systems typically involve beneﬁts decreasing over time, consistently with predictions of
optimal unemployment insurance models (Hopenayn ad Nicolini, 1997): when search eﬀort is un-
veriﬁable, the principal (the State) must give to the agent (the unemployed individual) an incentive
to make this eﬀort1. At longer unemployment durations, as human capital depreciates during the
unemployment spell, eliciting search eﬀort may become too costly relative to the social beneﬁts of
this activity (Pavoni and Violante, 2004), and hence beneﬁts become ﬂat. Finally, when the maxi-
mum duration of UBs is exhausted, individuals become eligible to means-tested social assistance of
the last resort. The way in which these various steps in UB payment are integrated is even more
important than the level of beneﬁts per se in aﬀecting job search incentives.
Moreover, unemployment beneﬁts in practice never act in isolation. They interact with other
institutions in “imperfect” labor markets, such as labor taxes, employment protection legislation
and unions. These interaction eﬀects are rarely taken into account by theory and empirical work.
Macroeconomic assessments of the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts typically include measures
of the generosity of the system as right-hand-side and un-instrumented variables. However, recent
work suggests that the causality may go the other way round. Governments in countries with a
high incidence of long-term unemployment are pressed to increase the duration of beneﬁts: regional
diversiﬁcation in the maximum duration of UBs in the US tends to follow increases in the duration
of unemployment in some States (Card and Levine, 2000). Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimueller (2002)
documented that this policy endogeneity may lead one to signiﬁcantly overstate the negative eﬀects
of unemployment beneﬁts on the duration of unemployment.
In order to win political opposition to the downscaling of beneﬁts, reforms of unemployment
insurance often involve a number of marginal adjustments of the beneﬁt formula and a gradual
tightening of entitlement rules. The grandfathering of past entitlements creates two-tier systems in
which just a fraction of the workforce is under the new regime. Under these conditions, estimates
o ft h ei m p a c to fu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁts applying the same rules to everybody, may be misleading.
Estimates of the eﬀects of UBs should as much as possible take into account these two-tier regimes.
The high frequency of UB reforms is also an asset for empirical research: there are many
“natural experiments” around to be exploited when assessing the macroeconomic eﬀects of UBs.
B u ti ti sd i ﬃcult to assess the empirical relevance of the predictions of models treating UBs as a
one dimensional institution, as reforms typically manipulate several parameters at once, e.g., they
increase beneﬁts, but reduce eligibility. Moreover, changes in entitlement conditions often take
place only via changes in law enforcement without observing any change in the legislation.
1E a r n i n gr e l a t e dU B so ﬀered at replacement rates decreasing over time reduce also incentives to elude or evade
payments of payroll contributions. This is particularly important in countries with a large informal sector. If more
generous beneﬁts are oﬀered only to workers with some oﬃcial employment history, then workers’ incentives to enter
the shadow sector are lower and shadow employer need to compensate more uninsured workers (Boeri, 2000).
9For these reasons, in the remainder of the paper we compare outcomes of countries with and
without unemployment beneﬁts before and after the reforms introducing the UB system. By relying
on dichotomic policy choices and mainly on within country variation, we can proceed without having
to rely on the standard one-dimensional measures of UB generosity. Given that we deal with regime
changes, we also do not need to worry about dual track reform strategies. We also concentrate on
labor market ﬂows, which, unlike aggregate stocks, are sensitive to institutional reforms, even in the
short-run. Institutional interactions can also be taken into account in this context. However, our
identiﬁcation strategy, detailed in the next section, requires that other institutions are not altered
at the time in which the UB system was introduced.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Outcome Variables
We consider a "treatment", the introduction of a UB system, and a series of outcome variables.
Motivated by the theoretical considerations outlined in the previous section, our ﬁrst set of outcome
variables are meant to capture the extent of job reallocation. Let us deﬁne gross job creation (JC)




















where i denotes country, j denotes sector, eijt denotes employment in sector j at time t, Eit is
total employment in country i at time t , gijt is the growth rate of employment in sector j at time
t relative to time t−1 and E+
i (E−
i ) is the set of expanding (shrinking) sectors. JCit measures job
creation by adding up employment gains in expanding sectors, JDit measures job destruction by
adding up employment losses at shrinking sectors. Job turnover is thus deﬁned as
JTit = JCit + JDit
JTit is therefore the size-weighted mean of the absolute value of sectorial growth rates. As
explained in the previous section, the eﬀect of UB on job turnover operates through diﬀerent
mechanisms according to diﬀerent theories. Therefore, in an eﬀort to discriminate between theories,
in addition to considering JT we also study the eﬀects of UBs on JC and JD, separately.
Matching models with endogenous job destruction imply that UBs act de facto as a wage ﬂoor,
cutting oﬀ low productivity jobs. Insofar as productivity varies across sectors, UBs are therefore
bound to aﬀect also the composition of employment by sector. The above reallocation measures
may capture idiosyncratic shocks not necessarily associated with sectorial job reallocation. In order
10to better capture genuine sectorial reallocation eﬀects, we shall also consider as outcome variables
the employment shares of agriculture, industry and services.
3.2 Data
Our empirical analysis exploits variation in the timing of adoption of a UB system from scratch in a
large sample of countries. Information on the date of introduction of unemployment beneﬁts systems
was taken primarily from Social Security Programs throughout the World (SSW).2 Employment
data were taken from the ILO LABORSTA database (http://laborsta.ilo.org/). Our main sample
consists of 46 countries which did not have any unemployment insurance scheme in place as of 1980
(see Appendix Table 1 for a complete list of the countries in our sample). Of these, 25 countries
introduced UBs for the ﬁrst time between 1980 and 2002.3 In principle, the ILO data span over
a 22 years period, from 1980 to 2002. However, the ILO series are complete only for a subset
of countries. The actual number of observations per country varies between 4 and 23.4 Because
calculating job reallocation measures entails using data from consecutive years, this implies that
the number of observations per country used in our estimation ranges between 3 and 22, with an
average of 12 and a median of 11. Figure 3 plots the number of countries that introduced UB
schemes during the time period of 1980 to 2002 (at yearly frequency), and Table 2 reports, for each
country, the year of introduction and the number of observations.
3.3 Descriptive Evidence and Identiﬁcation Issues
We begin our empirical analysis by presenting a visual summary of the raw data on the rates of
job creation, destruction and job turnover in three groups of countries in the period 1980-2002: (a)
countries that adopted UBs at some point between 1980 and 2002, (b) countries that never adopted
UBs and (c) countries which had UBs in place throughout the period of analysis. The three panels
of Figure 4 provide initial evidence that the introduction of UBs had an impact on job reallocation
in the group of countries that introduced UBs at some point during the period 1980-2002. In this
group of countries, the rate of job turnover appears to increase sharply starting in the late 1980s,
and then drops so that in the late 1990s it was back to roughly its previous level. This pattern
s e e m st ob ed r i v e nb yc h a n g e si nt h er a t eo fj o bd e struction. On the other hand, no discernible
trend or pattern is visible in the countries with UBs in place throughout the period or in countries
2This is an International Social Security Association (ISSA) publication which comprises four volumes: "Europe",
"Asia and the Paciﬁc", "Africa" and "The Americas". The information we use in this paper is taken from the
following issues: September 2002 for Europe, March 2003 for Asia and the Paciﬁc, September 2003 for Africa and
March 2004 for The Americas.
3In our robustness checks, among other things, we extend the sample to also include countries with UBs in place
throughout the period, which brings the number of countries to 77.
4The ILO data present some breaks in the series due, for instance, to changes in the reference population. We
have excluded the years when such breaks occurred.
11that never adopted UBs.
Because most of the countries which adopted UBs did so between 1988 and 1992 (see Table
2), the evidence provided in Figure 4 is somewhat suggestive of an eﬀect of UBs on job turnover.
In the remainder of the paper, we aim to assess whether such an eﬀect is consistent with a causal
interpretation. There are several reasons why the patterns displayed in Figure 4 might be spurious.
First of all, the averages plotted in Figure 4 were obtained from a variable number of countries
each year, due to limitations in the available data (see Appendix Table 1, where we show the values
of our outcome variables for the individual countries).5 Second, and more important, just looking
at diﬀerences in outcomes before and after the change and between "treated" and "untreated"
countries is not enough to prove the existence of a meaningful empirical association, let alone a
causal one. On the one hand, it is possible that our "treatment" countries are a selected group
that would have experienced increases in the outcome variables irrespective of the introduction of
UBs. In Table 3, we report summary statistics on the outcome and control variables separately for
countries in groups (a), (b) and (c) before and after the adoption of UBs.6 Comparing summary
statistics between "treated" and "untreated" groups (Panels A and B), we observe that, before
adopting UBs, the "treated" countries have, on average, higher GDP per capita and higher GDP
growth rates than "untreated" countries. "Untreated" countries also present higher rates of job
turnover, as is also apparent from Figure 4. These observations indicate that it is important to
properly take into account diﬀerences in observable and unobservable characteristics between UB
adopters and non-adopters when assessing the impact of UBs. Moreover, there is the possibility
of reverse causality. Quite simply, the introduction of UBs might have occurred as a response to
increased job turnover. It is therefore possible that the causality goes from job reallocation to UBs
rather than vice versa. This concern also comes from the fact that most of these countries come
from central planning.7 In our empirical analysis, we exploit the longitudinal nature of our data
to address the potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. In particular,
we include country ﬁxed eﬀects to control for selection into UBs based on levels of the outcome
variables, and a full set of country-speciﬁc time trends to control for selection into adopting UBs
based on the growth rate of our outcome variables (see Ashenfelter and Card 1985, Heckman and
5In our empirical analysis, we follow Heckman and Pages (2000) and we use yearly data rather than average our
outcome and dependent variables over periods of time, as often done in cross-country studies. To control for business
cycle conditions, we include GDP growth rates among the control variables.
6For the countries in panel A, "before" and "after" refer to the adoption of UBs. For countries in panels B and
C, the "before" period includes years before 1992 and the after period years after (and including) 1992. As can be
seen in Table 2, the year 1992 is the modal year of adoption of UBs in the group of countries which introduced UBs
schemes between 1980 and 2002.
7Except for the countries in the sample historically belonging to the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Serbia and
Slovenia, which had some UBs in place since the 1970s) and Hungary (which introduced a seminal unemployment
beneﬁt system in 1986-87), the remaining formerly planned economies introduced UB systems at the outset of the
transition to a market economy.
12Hotz 1989 and more recently Brown, Earle and Telegdy 2006).
3.4 Methodology
We use a reduced form approach to contrast our outcome variables in countries adopting UBs in a
given period with countries not adopting UBs. In particular, we estimate the following model:
Yit = UBitθ + Xitβ + μt + αi + τγi + uit (3)
where i indexes countries and t indexes time periods (years). The outcome variable, Y ,i st h e
annual JC, JD or JT as deﬁned in the previous section, or the share of employment in agriculture,
industry and services; UBit is a (0,1) variable indicating the presence of unemployment beneﬁts in
country i in period t; Xit is a set of time-varying, observable, country-speciﬁc characteristics that
aﬀect Yit, μt is an aggregate time eﬀect, αi is a country ﬁxed eﬀect, τi is a time trend, speciﬁc
to country i,a n duit is a disturbance term. We focus our attention on one single parameter, θ,
the coeﬃcient on UBs. An important strength of our empirical strategy is that the interpretation
of our empirical "experiment" (and of our coeﬃcient of interest) is very clear: we ask whether
the introduction of unemployment beneﬁts is associated with a signiﬁcant shift in the level of our
outcome variables.
T h et i m ee ﬀects account for evolving aggregate factors that might aﬀect our outcome variables.
The vector of controls, Xit, includes the growth rate of per capita GDP, to control for the busi-
ness cycle, the level of per capita GDP (in logs) to account for country "income" eﬀects8,a n d
the degree of openness to trade9. The inclusion of country eﬀects takes care of unobservable het-
erogeneity possibly correlated with UBs. In particular, our ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation allows the
country eﬀects to be correlated with current, past and present values of UB (i.e. with any of the
UBi1,UB i2,...,UB iT). We will thus be looking at eﬀects of UBs within countries over time, while
accounting for possible selection based on the level of job reallocation. Our coeﬃcient of interest, θ,
is the mean within-country-year diﬀerence in the outcome variables between countries that adopted
UBs and countries without UBs.10
The inclusion of country-speciﬁct i m et r e n d s ,ﬁnally, provides a control for the possibility that
the adoption of UBs is correlated with idiosyncratic trends in the rates of job turnover. Our
speciﬁcation is a version of the "random growth model", used in Ashenfelter and Card (1985),
Heckman and Hotz (1989) and more recently in Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006). In addition
8Upper-middle income countries tend to have strong administrative capacity, which is required for an eﬀective
implementation of UB schemes (Vodopivec, 2004).
9Openness to trade is measured as the sum of exports and imports over GDP. GDP and trade openness data were
taken from the Penn World Tables version 6.2.
10The inclusion of country ﬁxed eﬀe c t sa l s oc o n t r o l sf o rd i ﬀerences in the coverage and methodology of data
collection across country.
13to controlling for ﬁxed diﬀerences among countries, model (3) accounts for diﬀerent trends in job
reallocation that may aﬀect the propensity of a country to introduce unemployment beneﬁts.
In a further eﬀort to investigate whether the empirical association observed between UBs and





UBi,t0+qθt0+q + Xitβ + μt + αi + τγi + uit (4)
where t0 denotes the year of introduction of UBs,a n dUBi,t0+q is a dummy variable equal to
1i ny e a rt0 + q and 0 otherwise. Each coeﬃcient θt0+q measures the mean within-country-year
diﬀerence in the outcome variables between countries that adopted UBs and countries without UBs
in year t0 + q.11
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Baseline Results
In the three panels of Table 4, we report the estimates of model (3) where the dependent variable
is job turnover (ﬁrst panel), job creation (second panel) and job destruction (third panel). Column
(1) in each panel shows results of random eﬀects regressions, while columns (2) through (5) report
results of ﬁxed eﬀects regressions. The random eﬀects regressions exploit both within- and between-
country variation. Using both types of variation allows us to make use of all of the available data.
In fact, as shown in Table 2, data for both the "before" and "after" periods are available only for
14 of the 25 countries which adopted UBs. The ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation identiﬁes the eﬀect of
UBs from within-country variation only, thereby removing any ﬁxed diﬀerences in the rates of job
turnover, and making sure that we account for the possibility of selection into adopting UBs based
on levels of the outcome variables. Controlling for such a possibility is important, especially in the
light of Figure 4 and the summary statistics displayed in Table 3, which reveal that the rates of job
turnover tend to be higher in absolute terms in countries that never adopted UBs. In all cases, year
ﬁxed eﬀects and country-speciﬁc time trends are included among the regressors.12 As we explained
above, this is done in an attempt to control for the possibility of selection into introducing UBs
based on pre-existing trends in the outcome variables. It is worth noting that our speciﬁcation is
very demanding of the data, given that we have a limited number of observations per country.
The random eﬀects estimate reported in column (1) of the ﬁrst panel in Table 4 indicates that
the introduction of UBs is associated with a higher rate of job turnover. The estimated coeﬃcient
11D u et od a t al i m i t a t i o n s ,w eh a v ed e ﬁned the dummy UBi,t0+6 to be equal to 1 in years t0 +6 , t0 +7 ,e t c . . .
12We conducted F-tests on the joint probability that all country ﬁxed eﬀects, all year eﬀects and all year time
trends are equal to zero. The null hypothesis was in all cases rejected with p-values smaller than 0.0001.
14implies that the adoption of UBs is associated with a 3.3 percentage points higher job turnover rate,
and the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent conﬁdence level. The random eﬀects
estimates reported in the ﬁrst column of the second and third panel of Table 4 seem to suggest
that the higher job turnover is due to an increase in both the job creation rate and (especially) the
job destruction rate.
We now turn to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates. Column (2) uses all observations in the sample,
while column (3) uses only the country-year observations for which the control variables - log of
per-capita GDP, GDP growth rate and trade openness - were available. These control variables
were included in Columns (4) and (5). In all cases, the standard errors are robust to arbitrary
forms of heteroschedasticity. In Column (5), standard errors were also adjusted for ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation.13 Because the results are fairly consistent across samples and speciﬁcations, in
describing the ﬁxed-eﬀects results we focus on Column (5). The ﬁxed eﬀects regressions indicate
that UBs are associated with a 2.7 percentage points higher rate of job turnover. The coeﬃcient
is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent conﬁdence level. The ﬁrst and second panel of Table
4 indicate that the higher job turnover is due to an increase in both the job creation rate and the
job destruction rate. However, only the impact on job destruction is statistically signiﬁcant.
In Table 5, we turn to estimating the eﬀect of the introduction of UBs on the composition
of employment. In particular, our dependent variables are the employment shares of agriculture
(ﬁrst panel), industry (second panel) and services (third panel). Once again, column (1) in each
panel shows the estimated coeﬃcients of a random eﬀects version of model (3), and columns (2)
through (5) those of ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations. Our estimates indicate that the countries which
introduced UBs experienced a reduction of the share of employment in agriculture of about 3
percentage points a year, and an increase of the services share of about 3.7 percentage points. The
estimated standard errors, robust to arbitrary heteroschedasticity and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation,
indicate that the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent (services) and ﬁve percent
(agriculture) levels. We ﬁnd an eﬀect of UBs on the share of employment in the industrial sector
only in the random eﬀects speciﬁcation.
4.2 Further Robustness Checks
4.2.1 Excluding the early years of the transition to markets of formerly planned
economies
One possible concern with the above analysis is that most of the countries which introduced UBs in
the period considered were formerly planned economies. Thus, we may capture policy endogeneity
associated to the transition to a market economy: these countries introduced, mostly from scratch,
13Adjusting the standard errors for second-order autocorrelation produced nearly identical results.
15a UB system before starting the transition. To lessen this concern, in Tables 7 and 8 we replicate
the analyses of Tables 5 and 6 when excluding from the sample, for countries in the former Soviet
Union and Central and Eastern Europe, the year they started their transition, the year immediately
before and the year immediately after. Remarkably, our analysis is robust to this check, as the
estimated coeﬃcients remain similar to those estimated previously, both in magnitude and in terms
of statistical signiﬁcance.
4.2.2 Including countries with UB systems in place throughout the period among
the "control" group
In Table 8, we report the results of estimating (3) when we include among the control group the set
of countries that had unemployment beneﬁts schemes in place throughout the period of observation.
This exercise allows us to increase considerably the number of observations, thus enabling us to
obtain more robust estimates of the time eﬀects and the other controls. Because our premise is
that the introduction of UBs has the potential to aﬀect the rates of job turnover and sectorial
reallocation, we expect to ﬁnd that UB adopters experienced greater job turnover after introducing
UBs compared to both countries that never adopted UBs and countries that already had UBs in
place. The results from Table 8 are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those from the
previous tables, indicating that this is indeed the case.
4.2.3 Dynamic Eﬀects
In Figure 5, we display the estimated coeﬃcients from model (4) for job turnover, job creation and
destruction, as well as the associated conﬁdence intervals. Figure 5A reports results obtained from
the full sample and Figure 5B includes all of our control variables (which implies, as noted above,
a reduction in sample size). In all cases, year eﬀects, country ﬁxed eﬀects and country-speciﬁc
time trends are included, and the standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation.
The results displayed in Figures 5A and 5B show positive eﬀects of UBs on job turnover starting
the year of UB introduction, while the coeﬃcients on the years before are small (very close to zero)
and never statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding indicates that the increase in job turnover followed
the introduction of UBs, rather than viceversa, which is consistent with a causal interpretation of
our results.
Overall, there appears to be no eﬀect of UBs on job creation, and a tendency for the eﬀects of
UBs on job destruction to be stronger initially but fade away over time.
164.2.4 Controlling for Employment Protection (EPL) Strictness
Some of the eﬀects of UBs on structural change may come from substitutability of EPL with UBs.
Employment protection is an obstacle to job reallocation and a large body of empirical research
points to a negative relationship between gross job ﬂows (notably unemployment inﬂows) and EPL.
Regressions reported in Table 9 use data on EPL taken from Botero et al. (2004).14 The
advantage of this measure is that it is available for a very broad set of countries. Its disadvantage is
that of being measured at a point in time (the end of the 1990s). However, as documented in Boeri
et al. (2003), EPL measures, notably those referred to "regular" employment, tend not to vary
much over time within countries. The cross-sectional nature of these data forces us to estimate
random-eﬀects regressions. The random eﬀects estimates displayed in the ﬁrst panel of Table 9
conﬁrm a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of UBs on job destruction and job turnover
even when controlling for the degree of EPL strictness. The results reported in the bottom panel
conﬁrm that UBs are associated with an expansion of the services sector. We also ﬁnd a marginally
statistically signiﬁcant reduction of the industrial sector and a statistically insigniﬁcant reduction
of the agriculture sector, while the strictness of EPL increases the employment share of agriculture.
In Table 10, we estimate the eﬀect of UBs for countries in the bottom third, the middle third
and the top third of the distribution of EPL strictness. The results of this empirical test suggest
that the impact of UBs on job destruction is strongest in countries with a high degree of EPL
strictness. As for sectorial reallocation, our results indicate that the eﬀect of UBs on reducing
agriculture and expanding the services sector are strongest in countries with moderate levels of
EPL. These ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that UBs can better accommodate large scale
restructuring where employment protection is less stringent.
4.3 Discussion
Overall, the results of our empirical analysis strongly suggest that the introduction of UBs was
associated with greater job turnover, as a result of higher job destruction rates. The introduction
of UBs seems also to determine a shift of jobs from low-productivity sectors (agriculture) to services.
These conclusions are robust to the inclusion of controls for observable and unobservable country
eﬀects, year eﬀects and country-speciﬁc time trends, and robust to allowing for heteroschedastic
and autocorrelated residuals. These results provide corroborating evidence for the theories outlined
in Section 2 that highlight the role of unemployment beneﬁts in favoring greater job turnover and
reallocation in labor markets departing from perfect competition. Matching models, in particular,
imply a slow adjustment along the job creation margin, and a jump in job destruction, which is
14This index is the average of four sub-indices: (1) Alternative employment contracts; (2) Cost of increasing hours
worked; (3) Cost of ﬁring workers; and (4) Dismissal procedures. It is the variable "index_labor7a" in Botero et al.’s
dataset, available at http://iicd.som.yale.edu.
17consistent with the observed impact eﬀect of UBs on job turnover via the job destruction margin.
However, all the models reviewed in the theoretical section imply a permanent eﬀect on job creation
and destruction, that we do not see in the data. This may be due to the fact that, after the initial
introduction, UBs are subsequently downscaled as their ﬁscal costs increase. This was precisely
what happened in the formerly planned economies (Boeri, 2000). Another interpretation is related
to entitlement eﬀects and problems in the measurement of the shadow sector: as more jobs are
created in the sector allowing to gain entitlement to UBs, the denominator of our gross job ﬂow
measures increases.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The vast empirical literature on the macroeconomic eﬀects of unemployment insurance systems
overlooked so far the reallocation eﬀects of UBs, in terms of job turnover and in the inter-industry
distribution of employment.
In this paper, we tested the empirical implications of models allowing UBs to play a major role in
job creation and destruction as well as interindustry shifts of workers. Our strategy acknowledges
the multidimensional nature of UBs and exploits the fact that many countries introduced such
systems from scratch at some point during the period 1980-2002. Thanks to the longitudinal
nature of our data, we were able to ﬁnd remedies to potential selection, endogeneity and omitted
variables biases in our estimates. In particular, the panel dimension of our data allowed us to
control for observable and unobservable country characteristics, as well as for country-speciﬁct i m e
trends. The inclusion of country ﬁxed eﬀects ensures that we are controlling for omitted time-
invariant variables as well as for selection into adopting unemployment beneﬁts based on the level
of job turnover and reallocation, and the inclusion of country-speciﬁc time trends helps controlling
for selection into introducing unemployment beneﬁts based on the growth rate of job turnover and
interindustry job reallocation.
We found economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of UBs on gross job turnover, coming
primarily from higher rates of job destruction, as well as on inter-industry reallocation, that survive
to several robustness checks. The introduction of UBs is associated with about a 1.5 percentage
point increase in the yearly rate of job destruction and a 2.7 percentage points increase in job
turnover. This implies a positive eﬀect on job creation as well, but this eﬀect was not found
to be statistically signiﬁcant when estimated separately. Countries which introduced UBs also
experienced a decrease in the share of employment in agriculture of about 3 percentage points a
year, and an increase in the services sector share of 3 percentage points a year. The eﬀects on job
destruction are initially larger but fade away over time. While the impact eﬀect on job destruction
is consistent with matching models, the dynamic eﬀects are not, as these models imply a permanent
18eﬀect of UBs on job creation and destruction rates. We oﬀer two possible interpretations for the
time pattern of the eﬀects of UBs on job reallocation. The ﬁrst interpretation is that, after the
initial introduction, UBs are subsequently downscaled as their ﬁscal costs increase, along with the
experience of formerly planned economies. The second interpretation is related to the expansion of
the legal sector, allowing workers to gain entitlement to UBs, and statistical under-reporting of the
shadow sector. Moreover, our identiﬁcation assumption requires no additional institutional change
at the time in which UBs are introduced and it is plausible that other institutions interfering with
labor market were adjusted after the introduction of UBs. One of the institutions interfering with
the eﬀects of UBs on job reallocation is employment protection: we ﬁnd that countries with stricter
employment protection experience larger increases in job destruction rates after the introduction
of UBs.
Future work would use ﬁner measures of job turnover, based on ﬁrm-level information, when
these data become available for a suﬃciently large set of countries. At the same time, looking at the
quality of structural change as well, notably evaluating the eﬀects of UBs on job tenure (a proxy for
match quality), represents a potentially fruitful avenue for research, as it permits to directly test
the empirical relevance of stochastic job matching models. Results from individual data on the US
(Centeno, 2004) suggest that there may be indeed important eﬀects on unemployment beneﬁts on
match quality. It should also be noted that our estimates are averages across countries that could
mask substantial heterogeneity. We were able to uncover some heterogeneity by allowing the eﬀects
of unemployment beneﬁts to vary with the degree of strictness of employment protection. Finally,
investment in data gathering on the design of UBs in a large number of countries would pave the
way for future work on the dynamic eﬀects of UBs on job reallocation, allowing to improve on our
empirical strategy, properly capturing changes in UBs after their introduction. Better measures and
micro data sets would also allow researchers to conduct within-country studies, perhaps exploiting
geographical-time or industry-time variation (Freeman, 2007).
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22Table 1: List of Industries 
 
Description
Rev. 1 Rev. 2
Major 1 A+B Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
Major 2 C Mining and Quarrying
Major 3 D Manufacturing
Major 4 E Electricity, Gas and Water
Major 5 F Construction
Major 6 G+H Wholesale Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotel
Major 7 I Transport, Storage and communication
Major 8 J+K Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services
Major 9 L+M+N+O Community, Social and Person Services
ISIC code
Source: ILO LABORSTA Database (http://laborsta.ilo.org/). Note: The "residual" category was computed, case by case, 



























 Table 2: Number of Observations for the Countries which introduced 





first last before after
Albania 1995 2002 1993 0 8
Argentina 1983 2002 1991 2 10
Azerbaijan 1984 2002 1992 7 10
Belarus 1988 1994 1991 3 4
Brazil 1982 1999 1986 4 10
Bulgaria 1981 2001 1989 8 12
China 1988 2002 1986 0 15
Colombia 1986 2002 1990 4 11
Czech Republic 1994 2002 1991 0 9
Estonia 1990 2002 1991 1 11
Georgia 1999 2002 1993 0 4
Hungary 1992 2001 1986 0 10
Korea, Republic of 1981 2002 1993 12 10
Kyrgyzstan 1987 2002 1992 5 11
Latvia 1997 2002 1992 0 5
Lithuania 1983 2001 1992 9 10
Moldova 2000 2002 1992 0 3
Poland 1982 2002 1989 7 12
Romania 1981 2002 1991 10 12
Russia 1998 2002 1992 0 5
Slovak Republic 1995 2002 1991 0 8
Turkey 1983 2002 2000 12 2
Ukraine 1988 2000 1992 4 8
Uruguay 1987 2000 1981 0 11
Uzbekistan 1996 1999 1992 0 4
Years of Observation N. Observations
Notes: The number of observations listed in columns 5 and 6 refer to the years for which we were able to
compute job turnover measures. "Before" and "After" refer to years before and after UBs were adopted. The










 Table 3: Summary Statistics of Outcome and Control Variables 
 
Variable: Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev
Log of per-capita GDP 204 8.712 0.547 52 8.450 0.303
GDP growth 199 2.480 6.651 51 2.923 4.717
Openness to Trade 204 73.174 39.976 52 32.822 14.955
EPL Strictness 175 0.513 0.156 77 0.499 0.130
Job Creation Rate 215 0.013 0.015 88 0.026 0.022
Job Destruction Rate 215 0.026 0.027 88 0.024 0.025
Job Turnover Rate 215 0.050 0.033 88 0.039 0.026
Agriculture share 215 0.247 0.181 88 0.267 0.110
Industry share 215 0.255 0.088 88 0.317 0.089
Services share 215 0.379 0.111 88 0.450 0.173
Variable: Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev
Log of per-capita GDP 89 8.069 0.582 167 8.488 0.596
GDP growth 89 1.921 4.169 167 2.089 3.281
Openness to Trade 89 85.846 62.118 167 95.880 72.020
EPL Strictness 63 0.404 0.148 120 0.452 0.158
Job Creation Rate 89 0.044 0.032 167 0.046 0.032
Job Destruction Rate 89 0.014 0.020 167 0.016 0.016
Job Turnover Rate 89 0.058 0.035 167 0.063 0.039
Agriculture share 89 0.334 0.220 167 0.289 0.168
Industry share 89 0.199 0.071 167 0.206 0.053
Services share 89 0.472 0.129 167 0.415 0.126
Variable: Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev
Log of per-capita GDP 197 9.317 0.513 283 9.753 0.532
GDP growth 197 2.091 3.004 283 2.089 2.518
Openness to Trade 197 49.291 31.087 283 75.830 49.252
EPL Strictness 194 0.469 0.215 280 0.487 0.205
Job Creation Rate 197 0.021 0.019 283 0.019 0.017
Job Destruction Rate 197 0.012 0.012 283 0.012 0.012
Job Turnover Rate 197 0.034 0.020 283 0.031 0.021
Agriculture share 197 0.091 0.090 283 0.113 0.095
Industry share 197 0.254 0.054 283 0.290 0.055
Services share 197 0.638 0.090 283 0.592 0.089
Panel A: Countries which Introduced UBs During the period
Notes: For the countries in Panel A, before and after are defined based on the date of introduction of UBs. For the countries
in panels B and C, the "before" period includes years before 1992 and the after period years after (and including) 1992. The
year 1992 is the modal year of adoption of UBs in the group of countries which introduced UBs schemes between 1980 and
2002. Job Creation, Job Destruction and Job Turnover were calculated by the Authors based on ILO data, as described in the
text. Data on per capita GDP, GDP growth and Trade Openness are from the Penn Tables version 6.2. The measure of EPL
strictness is taken from Botero et al., 2004 (variable "index_labor7a" in the dataset available at http://iicd.som.yale.edu).
Before After
Before After
Panel C: Countries with UBs in place throughout the period
Before After
Panel B: Countries without UBs throughout the period 
 
 Table 4: Effect of the Introduction of Unemployment Benefits Schemes 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment Benefits 0.0331*** 0.0388*** 0.0291** 0.0273** 0.0273**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
GDP growth 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP -0.0464* -0.0464**
(0.025) (0.022)
Openness to Trade 0.000346* 0.000346**
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0816** 0.032 0.056 0.415**
(0.032) (0.049) (0.052) (0.200)
Observations 559 559 506 506 506
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.31 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.21
Unemployment Benefits 0.0119* 0.008 0.013 0.014 0.014
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
GDP growth 0.000570** 0.000570**
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP -0.022 -0.022
(0.018) (0.015)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0717** -0.021 -0.010 0.157
(0.032) (0.044) (0.045) (0.140)
Observations 559 559 506 506 506
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.3 0.18 0.2 0.21 0.21
Unemployment Benefits 0.0212*** 0.0307*** 0.0159** 0.0134** 0.0134**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
GDP growth -0.000811*** -0.000811***
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP -0.025 -0.025
(0.020) (0.018)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.010 0.0537** 0.0658** 0.258
(0.014) (0.026) (0.026) (0.160)
Observations 559 559 506 506 506
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.31 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.26
Notes: Random and fixed effects regressions, estimated using yearly observations covering the period 1980-2002. The dependent variables (job creation, destruction and
turnover) were calculated as explained in the text. The explanatory variable of interest, "Unemployment Benefits" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if unemployment
benefits schemes were in place in a given country-year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients reported in the first column were obtained from estimating them o d e lu s i n ga l l
country-year observations for which we were able to calculate job reallocation measures. The results reported in the other columns only include country-year
observations for which data on the control variables (per-capita GDP, GDP growth and openness to trade) were available. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
In the first three columns, standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroschedasticity. In the fourth column, they are adjusted for both heteroschedasticity and
first-order serial correlation. Levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
dependent variable: job destruction rate
dependent variable: job creation rate
dependent variable: job turnover rate
 Table 5: Effect of the Introduction of Unemployment Benefits Schemes 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment Benefits 0.0339* -0.011 -0.022 -0.0318** -0.0318**
(0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
GDP growth 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Log of per-capita GDP -0.0969*** -0.0969***
(0.029) (0.029)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Constant 0.239*** 0.732*** 0.712*** 1.481***
(0.089) (0.140) (0.140) (0.270)
Observations 559 559 506 506 506
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.8 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.58
Unemployment Benefits -0.0484*** -0.010 -0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
GDP growth 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP 0.0979*** 0.0979***
(0.012) (0.014)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Constant 0.139*** 0.124** 0.125** -0.648***
(0.042) (0.061) (0.059) (0.120)
Observations 559 559 506 506 506
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.7 0.79 0.73 0.77 0.77
Unemployment Benefits 0.0347** 0.0185*** 0.0275*** 0.0268*** 0.0268***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
GDP growth 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP -0.011 -0.011
(0.016) (0.017)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Constant 0.357*** 0.118 0.122 0.211
(0.050) (0.080) (0.082) (0.150)
Observations 559 559 506 506 506
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 8 70 . 7 20 . 7 10 . 7 10 . 7 1
Notes: Random and fixed effects regressions, estimated using yearly observations covering the period 1980-2002. The dependent variables (share of employment in agriculture,
industrial sector and services) were calculated as explained in the text. The explanatory variable of interest, "Unemployment Benefits" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
unemployment benefits schemes were in place in a given country-year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients reported in the first column were obtained from estimating the model
using all country-year observations for which we were able to calculate sector shares. The results reported in the other columns only include country-year observations for which
data on the control variables (per-capita GDP, GDP growth and openness to trade) were available. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. In the first three columns,
standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroschedasticity. In the fourth column, they are adjusted for both heteroschedasticity and first-order serial correlation. Levels of
statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
dependent variable: agriculture share
dependent variable: industry share
dependent variable: services share
 Table 6: Effect of the Introduction of Unemployment Benefits Schemes 
on Job Creation, Destruction and Job Turnover (Excluding the first years 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment Benefits 0.0352*** 0.0399*** 0.0301** 0.0294* 0.0294**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
GDP growth 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP -0.038 -0.038
(0.027) (0.024)
Openness to Trade 0.000378* 0.000378**
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0829*** 0.051 0.068 0.361*
(0.032) (0.048) (0.050) (0.210)
Observations 530 530 496 496 496
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.31 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21
Unemployment Benefits 0.0199** 0.0191* 0.018 0.018 0.018
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
GDP growth 0.000666** 0.000666**
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP -0.031 -0.0306*
(0.020) (0.018)
Openness to Trade 0.000326* 0.000326**
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0708** -0.011 -0.006 0.231
(0.033) (0.043) (0.045) (0.160)
Observations 530 530 496 496 496
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.28 0.2 0.20 0.22 0.22
Unemployment Benefits 0.0153*** 0.0208*** 0.013 0.0116* 0.0116*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP growth -0.000807*** -0.000807***
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP -0.008 -0.008
(0.019) (0.017)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.012 0.0618*** 0.0742*** 0.130
(0.013) (0.024) (0.025) (0.150)
Observations 530 530 496 496 496
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.27
Notes: Random and fixed effects regressions, estimated using yearly observations covering the period 1980-2002. For countries from the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe, we have dropped the year they begun their transition to market economies, the year immediately before and the year immediately after. The dependent variables (job creation,
destruction and turnover) were calculated as explained in the text. The explanatory variable of interest, "Unemployment Benefits" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if UB schemes were in
place in a given country-year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients reported in the first column were obtained from estimating the model using all country-year observations for which we were
able to calculate job reallocation measures. The results reported in the other columns only include country-year observations for which data on the control variables (per-capita GDP, GDP
growth and openness to trade) were available. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. In the first 3 columns, standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroschedasticity. In the
4th column, they are adjusted for heteroschedasticity and first-order serial correlation. *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%and 1%. 
dependent variable: job destruction rate
dependent variable: job creation rate
dependent variable: job turnover rate
 Table 7: Effect of the Introduction of Unemployment Benefits Schemes 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment Benefits 0.030 -0.0239* -0.0312* -0.0426*** -0.0426**
(0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
GDP growth 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Log of per-capita GDP -0.103*** -0.103***
(0.027) (0.028)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Constant 0.232*** 0.712*** 0.701*** 1.515***
(0.087) (0.140) (0.140) (0.250)
Observations 530 530 496 496 496
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.8 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59
Unemployment Benefits -0.0568*** -0.006 -0.001 0.010 0.010
(0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
GDP growth 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP 0.0999*** 0.0999***
(0.014) (0.015)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Constant 0.148*** 0.135** 0.131** -0.656***
(0.042) (0.061) (0.059) (0.130)
Observations 530 530 496 496 496
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R-squared 0.7 0.81 0.73 0.77 0.77
Unemployment Benefits 0.0490*** 0.0280*** 0.0335*** 0.0335*** 0.0335***
(0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
GDP growth 0.000 -0.000355*
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of per-capita GDP 0.004 0.004
(0.016) (0.016)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Constant 0.354*** 0.129 0.130 0.101
(0.050) (0.080) (0.081) (0.140)
Observations 530 530 496 496 496
Number of id 46 46 45 45 45
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 8 70 . 7 20 . 7 10 . 7 10 . 7 1
Notes: Random and fixed effects regressions, estimated using yearly observations covering the period 1980-2002. For countries from the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, we
have dropped the year they begun their transition to market economies, the year immediately before and the year immediately after. The dependent variables (share of employment in agriculture,
industrial sector and services) were calculated as explained in the text. The explanatory variable of interest, "Unemployment Benefits" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if UB schemes were in place in a
given country-year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients reported in the first column were obtained from estimating the model using all country-year observations for which we were able to calculate job
reallocation measures. The results reported in the other columns only include country-year observations for which data on the control variables (per-capita GDP, GDP growth and openness to trade)
were available. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. In the first 3 columns, standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroschedasticity. In the 4th column, they are adjusted for
heteroschedasticity and first-order serial correlation. *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%and 1%. 
dependent variable: agriculture share
dependent variable: industry share
dependent variable: services share
 Table 8: Effect of the Introduction of Unemployment Benefits Schemes 
on Job Turnover and Sector Shares, including among the control group 
countries with UB schemes in place throughout the period 
 
 
job creation job destruction job turnover
(1) (2) (3)
Unemployment Benefits (coefficient) 0.018 0.013 0.030
s.e. heteroschedasticity robust (0.011) (0.007)* (0.013)**
s.e. heter. & autocorrel. robust (0.011) (0.007)* (0.013)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes
Observations 986 986 986
Number of Countries 76 76 76
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 2 10 . 2 90 . 2 0
agriculture industry services
(1) (2) (3)
Unemployment Benefits (coefficient) -0.038 0.010 0.0275
s.e. heteroschedasticity robust (0.017)** (0.008) (0.012)**
s.e. heter. & autocorrel. robust (0.019)** (0.009) (0.013)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes
Observations 986 986 986
Number of Countries 76 76 76
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 5 80 . 8 00 . 7 5
Notes: Fixed effects regressions, estimated using yearly observations covering the period 1980-2002. The explanatory variable of
interest, "Unemployment Benefits" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if unemployment benefits schemes were in place in a given country-
year and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * significant















 Table 9: Unemployment Benefits and Structural Change, controlling for 
Employment Protection (EPL) 
 
job creation job destruction job turnover
(1) (2) (3)
Unemployment Benefits 0.010 0.0127*** 0.0225**
(0.008) (0.005) (0.010)
Employment Protection 0.021 0.022 0.044
(0.025) (0.020) (0.034)
GDP growth 0.000952*** -0.00104*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log per capita GDP -0.007 0.001 -0.005
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
openness 0.000164*** 0.000 0.000175***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.012 0.024 0.036
(0.064) (0.047) (0.081)
Observations 400 400 400
Number of id 33 33 33
R2 0.39 0.33 0.37
agriculture industry services
(1) (2) (3)
Unemployment Benefits -0.019 -0.0204* 0.0399**
(0.017) (0.011) (0.018)
Employment Protection 0.231*** -0.147** -0.0955*
(0.056) (0.058) (0.055)
GDP growth 0.00130** -0.000747* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
log per capita GDP -0.263*** 0.135*** 0.125***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
openness 0.000 -0.000435*** 0.000420***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.850*** -0.918*** -0.860***
(0.170) (0.120) (0.120)
Observations 400 400 400
Number of id 33 33 33
R2 0.92 0.83 0.92
This table reports results of random effects regressions. The explanatory variable of interest, "Unemployment Benefits" is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if unemployment benefits schemes were in place in a given country-year and 0 otherwise. The
measure of EPL strictness is taken from Botero et al., 2004 (variable "index_labor7a" in the dataset available at
http://iicd.som.yale.edu). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance are indicated
by asterisks: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 Table 10: Unemployment Benefits and Structural Change, by level of 
Employment Protection (EPL) 
 
job creation job destruction job turnover
Unemployment Benefits (1) (2) (3)
      EPL < 33th pctile 0.048* 0.013 0.061**
(0.028) (0.012) (0.030)
      33th pctile ≤ EPL ≤ 66th pctile -0.004 0.004 0.000
(0.012) (0.007) (0.017)
      EPL > 66th pctile 0.013 0.052*** 0.066***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018)
GDP growth 0.000843*** -0.00121*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log per capita GDP -0.022 0.001 -0.021
(0.022) (0.020) (0.028)
openness 0.000344* 0.000 0.000440**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.167 0.057 0.224
(0.180) (0.160) (0.230)
Observations 400 400 400
Number of id 33 33 33
R-squared 0.25 0.33 0.28
agriculture industry services
Unemployment Benefits (1) (2) (3)
      EPL < 33th pctile -0.013 0.015 0.007
(0.025) (0.016) (0.015)
      33th pctile ≤ EPL ≤ 66th pctile -0.049*** 0.002 0.044***
(0.018) (0.010) (0.011)
      EPL > 66th pctile 0.005 0.002 -0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
GDP growth 0.000831** 0.000 -0.000456**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log per capita GDP -0.106*** 0.122*** -0.001
(0.024) (0.015) (0.017)
openness 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.576*** -0.823*** 0.112
(0.240) (0.140) (0.150)
Observations 400 400 400
Number of id 33 33 33
R-squared 0.80 0.79 0.86
This table reports results of fixed effects regressions. The explanatory variable of interest, "Unemployment Benefits" is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if unemployment benefits schemes were in place in a given country-year and 0 otherwise. The measure of EPL strictness is taken
from Botero et al., 2004 (variable "index_labor7a" in the dataset available at http://iicd.som.yale.edu). Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 Figure 1: Job creation and destruction without (continuous line) 
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Figure 2: Adjustment to the long-run equilibrium following the 
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 Figure 4: Evolution of Job Creation, Job Destruction & Job 
Turnover, 1981-2001 
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 Figure 5A: Dynamic Effects of UBs on Job Creation, Job 
Destruction & Job Turnover – full sample 
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Notes: These figures display coefficients and confidence intervals obtained from estimation of model (3), as explained in 
the text. YOA = Year of Adoption of unemployment benefits schemes. The sample includes all observations for which we 
were able to compute job reallocation measures. Standard errors were adjusted for heteroschedasticity and first-order 
autocorrelation. 
 Figure 5B: Dynamic Effects of UBs on Job Creation, Job 
Destruction & Job Turnover – with control variables 
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Notes: These figures display coefficients and confidence intervals obtained from estimation of model (3), as explained in 
the text. Control variables (log of per capita GDP, GDP growth and openness to trade) were included in the regressions. 
YOA = Year of Adoption of unemployment benefits schemes. Controls include the log of per-capita GDP, GDP growth, 
and openness to trade. Standard errors were adjusted for heteroschedasticity and first-order autocorrelation. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev.
Albania 8 8.120 0.200 8 7.782 10.902 8 70.686 11.771 8 0.041 0.050 8 0.026 0.013 8 0.614 0.250 8 0.084 0.019
Argentina 12 9.178 0.195 12 0.603 5.851 12 18.144 4.962 12 0.029 0.020 12 0.023 0.023 12 0.007 0.003 12 0.643 0.046
Azerbaijan 8 7.953 0.273 7 0.426 15.444 8 95.624 14.898 17 0.025 0.016 17 0.019 0.016 17 0.337 0.040 17 0.376 0.060
Belarus 0007 0.011 0.006 7 0.031 0.012 7 0.224 0.006 7 0.370 0.016
Brazil 14 8.615 0.192 14 0.828 4.020 14 14.967 4.764 14 0.029 0.016 14 0.010 0.011 14 0.271 0.025 14 0.522 0.033
Bulgaria 10 8.808 0.099 9 -0.503 5.920 10 90.249 24.803 20 0.011 0.009 20 0.028 0.032 20 0.244 0.023 20 0.388 0.048
China 15 7.796 0.463 15 8.298 3.264 15 43.660 6.713 15 0.038 0.038 15 0.008 0.009 15 0.514 0.049 15 0.120 0.016
Colombia 15 8.517 0.191 15 1.550 1.400 15 37.147 7.397 15 0.040 0.042 15 0.009 0.009 15 0.030 0.053 15 0.688 0.035
Czech Republic 9 9.456 0.117 9 2.022 1.581 9 113.564 24.054 9 0.011 0.008 9 0.016 0.009 9 0.073 0.010 9 0.535 0.017
Estonia 12 9.101 0.234 11 0.638 8.865 12 123.602 44.071 12 0.016 0.013 12 0.043 0.028 12 0.136 0.054 12 0.539 0.069
Georgia 4 8.287 0.087 4 3.751 2.267 4 63.079 6.259 4 0.037 0.030 4 0.045 0.054 4 0.510 0.024 4 0.376 0.001
Hungary 10 9.174 0.141 10 2.928 2.433 10 101.083 37.008 10 0.012 0.010 10 0.020 0.021 10 0.083 0.013 10 0.588 0.009
Korea, Republic of 22 9.058 0.573 22 6.353 4.181 22 50.487 14.957 22 0.035 0.013 22 0.014 0.012 22 0.187 0.079 22 0.499 0.075
Kyrgyzstan 10 8.054 0.139 9 0.469 10.759 10 109.251 25.317 16 0.030 0.020 16 0.020 0.019 16 0.440 0.076 16 0.373 0.015
Latvia 5 9.049 0.152 5 5.968 2.146 5 93.591 3.723 5 0.033 0.027 5 0.026 0.014 5 0.175 0.028 5 0.562 0.028
Lithuania 9 8.945 0.156 8 3.058 5.112 9 109.560 27.741 19 0.021 0.023 19 0.034 0.031 19 0.204 0.022 19 0.449 0.058
Moldova 3 7.794 0.097 3 5.893 4.842 3 135.452 8.783 3 0.020 0.021 3 0.015 0.006 3 0.506 0.007 3 0.351 0.005
Poland 19 8.639 0.325 19 2.079 4.160 19 33.644 19.368 19 0.011 0.009 19 0.027 0.026 19 0.269 0.044 19 0.408 0.074
Romania 22 8.433 0.130 22 0.185 5.548 22 49.841 13.224 22 0.022 0.022 22 0.029 0.037 22 0.363 0.052 22 0.285 0.019
Russia 5 9.084 0.181 5 5.510 4.810 5 67.524 3.224 5 0.035 0.025 5 0.013 0.014 5 0.148 0.017 5 0.581 0.011
Slovak Republic 8 9.117 0.111 8 3.695 1.201 8 132.213 17.452 8 0.019 0.011 8 0.020 0.012 8 0.091 0.016 8 0.535 0.020
Turkey 14 8.402 0.253 14 1.821 5.068 14 37.702 10.521 14 0.043 0.031 14 0.019 0.022 14 0.382 0.143 14 0.387 0.105
Ukraine 7 8.509 0.133 6 -5.437 9.963 7 96.488 24.812 12 0.015 0.018 12 0.046 0.047 12 0.231 0.030 12 0.175 0.045
Uruguay 11 8.980 0.212 11 2.176 4.911 11 31.949 5.522 11 0.020 0.018 11 0.015 0.008 11 0.048 0.007 11 0.676 0.020
Uzbekistan 4 8.080 0.062 4 3.093 2.425 4 61.028 4.859 4 0.012 0.004 4 0.003 0.003 4 0.398 0.011 4 0.349 0.003
N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev.
Bolivia 8 7.807 0.100 8 1.295 0.938 8 42.633 2.562 8 0.093 0.042 8 0.025 0.021 8 0.044 0.019 8 0.504 0.063
Costa Rica 21 8.656 0.289 21 0.788 3.723 21 67.330 20.468 21 0.051 0.038 21 0.014 0.012 21 0.239 0.042 21 0.499 0.025
Cuba 7 8.611 0.093 7 2.807 2.353 7 31.899 1.886 7 0.038 0.052 7 0.024 0.031 7 0.250 0.027 7 0.550 0.028
Dominican Republic 11 8.599 0.204 11 5.034 2.111 11 40.687 2.478 11 0.049 0.040 11 0.017 0.014 11 0.167 0.018 11 0.596 0.026
El Salvador 11 8.328 0.189 11 1.642 1.538 11 54.724 13.863 11 0.060 0.039 11 0.019 0.015 11 0.201 0.073 11 0.528 0.064
Honduras 9 7.510 0.214 9 0.392 3.691 9 96.064 6.475 9 0.051 0.041 9 0.023 0.033 9 0.404 0.174 9 0.393 0.148
Indonesia 16 7.998 0.286 16 3.299 3.871 16 76.981 10.288 16 0.044 0.021 16 0.015 0.013 16 0.493 0.055 16 0.356 0.032
Jamaica 9 8.408 0.017 9 -0.024 2.014 9 107.318 12.823 9 0.032 0.027 9 0.019 0.020 9 0.226 0.016 9 0.589 0.026
Malaysia 18 8.718 0.500 18 3.457 3.108 18 155.946 50.339 18 0.043 0.021 18 0.011 0.014 18 0.255 0.070 18 0.468 0.028
Mexico 7 8.920 0.094 7 2.352 2.472 7 55.873 7.762 7 0.044 0.025 7 0.014 0.011 7 0.199 0.024 7 0.509 0.011
Nicaragua 11 8.049 0.063 11 -0.974 4.592 11 59.261 14.531 11 0.040 0.019 11 0.006 0.008 11 0.415 0.020 11 0.392 0.008
Pakistan 22 7.515 0.288 22 2.097 1.801 22 31.475 2.612 22 0.038 0.023 22 0.015 0.018 22 0.493 0.030 22 0.315 0.035
Panama 18 8.671 0.268 18 0.766 3.288 18 145.072 21.223 18 0.045 0.033 18 0.014 0.015 18 0.232 0.050 18 0.542 0.037
Paraguay 11 8.249 0.137 11 0.243 2.279 11 51.453 18.574 11 0.049 0.039 11 0.011 0.009 11 0.016 0.005 11 0.427 0.010
Peru 5 8.330 0.019 5 0.355 2.708 5 34.732 1.123 5 0.055 0.026 5 0.013 0.010 5 0.075 0.014 5 0.693 0.012
Philippines 20 7.880 0.223 20 0.856 4.312 20 86.473 23.535 20 0.028 0.014 20 0.006 0.007 20 0.456 0.049 20 0.394 0.037
Saudi Arabia 3 9.650 0.019 3 -1.856 3.442 3 66.013 2.626 3 0.029 0.005 3 0.015 0.004 3 0.072 0.009 3 0.640 0.003
Singapore 17 9.657 0.456 17 3.601 4.417 17 292.313 59.753 17 0.034 0.026 17 0.012 0.012 17 0.006 0.004 17 0.659 0.039
Sri Lanka 7 8.047 0.145 7 4.586 1.434 7 78.880 4.324 7 0.079 0.037 7 0.045 0.020 7 0.406 0.030 7 0.352 0.019
Thailand 19 8.362 0.474 19 4.420 4.558 19 85.184 25.525 19 0.042 0.025 19 0.023 0.027 19 0.580 0.073 19 0.263 0.043
Vietnam 6 7.668 0.109 6 3.750 1.773 6 100.225 15.779 6 0.048 0.015 6 0.017 0.016 6 0.649 0.012 6 0.151 0.005
Countries with No Unemployment Benefits Scheme Throughout the Period
Countries which Introduced Unemployment Benefits Schemes During the Period 1980-2002
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Appendix Table A1 - Country-level Summary Statistics
Log of per-capita GDP GDP growth Openness to Trade Job Creation RateN Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev.
Australia 17 9.838 0.302 17 1.903 1.969 17 35.554 7.491 17 0.016 0.016 17 0.008 0.007 17 0.065 0.009 17 0.700 0.038
Austria 19 9.913 0.244 19 2.051 1.298 19 72.744 11.543 19 0.016 0.014 19 0.010 0.007 19 0.077 0.012 19 0.582 0.044
Bangladesh 3 6.979 0.169 3 1.195 1.538 3 16.209 1.402 3 0.051 0.011 3 0.013 0.010 3 0.604 0.052 3 0.229 0.058
Belgium 10 9.933 0.148 10 2.069 1.027 10 144.711 13.200 10 0.016 0.011 10 0.007 0.004 10 0.026 0.005 10 0.660 0.023
Canada 21 9.805 0.265 21 1.670 2.616 21 62.465 14.161 21 0.017 0.014 21 0.008 0.010 21 0.057 0.010 21 0.716 0.024
Chile 19 8.850 0.419 19 3.769 3.514 19 47.978 10.555 19 0.033 0.021 19 0.008 0.008 19 0.186 0.028 19 0.589 0.035
Croatia 6 9.082 0.092 6 3.513 1.661 6 101.421 4.684 6 0.026 0.023 6 0.026 0.015 6 0.166 0.012 6 0.538 0.016
Denmark 17 9.941 0.221 17 1.832 1.840 17 69.658 11.454 17 0.014 0.013 17 0.013 0.007 17 0.049 0.011 17 0.681 0.020
Ecuador 12 8.334 0.045 12 -0.246 1.336 12 66.856 6.678 12 0.046 0.028 12 0.015 0.020 12 0.077 0.008 12 0.678 0.040
Egypt 11 8.214 0.201 11 2.528 1.065 11 45.208 6.073 11 0.040 0.026 11 0.028 0.032 11 0.328 0.041 11 0.455 0.039
Finland 21 9.676 0.265 21 1.648 3.815 21 54.304 12.955 21 0.009 0.007 21 0.016 0.018 21 0.092 0.025 21 0.618 0.048
Germany 11 10.037 0.097 11 1.202 1.247 11 55.841 9.364 11 0.011 0.015 11 0.018 0.013 11 0.036 0.006 11 0.617 0.025
Greece 20 9.227 0.246 20 1.237 2.319 20 39.959 10.077 20 0.014 0.007 20 0.013 0.009 20 0.236 0.048 20 0.507 0.065
Hong Kong 21 9.849 0.398 21 3.477 4.213 21 205.068 69.786 21 0.029 0.017 21 0.014 0.008 21 0.008 0.005 21 0.662 0.106
Ireland 18 9.532 0.427 18 5.082 3.383 18 120.109 37.815 18 0.030 0.025 18 0.014 0.010 18 0.128 0.035 18 0.575 0.027
Israel 18 9.541 0.321 18 2.175 2.749 18 56.843 8.387 18 0.029 0.020 18 0.009 0.007 18 0.039 0.013 18 0.650 0.027
Italy 20 9.713 0.278 20 1.957 1.032 20 42.273 9.025 20 0.011 0.006 20 0.010 0.008 20 0.089 0.028 20 0.582 0.030
Japan 22 9.769 0.310 22 1.976 2.152 22 16.164 2.289 22 0.012 0.007 22 0.010 0.012 22 0.070 0.018 22 0.590 0.029
Netherlands 14 9.969 0.187 14 2.298 1.468 14 112.234 16.277 14 0.019 0.007 14 0.007 0.005 14 0.039 0.007 14 0.709 0.017
New Zealand 16 9.728 0.177 16 1.389 2.140 16 61.297 7.220 16 0.019 0.012 16 0.012 0.012 16 0.100 0.009 16 0.656 0.017
Norway 19 9.935 0.317 19 2.458 1.721 19 68.199 6.660 19 0.011 0.006 19 0.010 0.010 19 0.068 0.015 19 0.693 0.034
Portugal 15 9.425 0.334 15 3.197 2.441 15 58.619 12.059 15 0.029 0.026 15 0.015 0.010 15 0.161 0.047 15 0.493 0.049
Slovenia 9 9.702 0.156 9 4.000 0.930 9 108.131 8.754 9 0.028 0.012 9 0.018 0.010 9 0.438 0.026 9 0.367 0.019
South Africa 2 9.098 0.037 2 2.573 0.159 2 51.319 0.237 2 0.021 0.024 2 0.049 0.036 2 0.155 0.018 2 0.538 0.012
Spain 22 9.446 0.353 22 2.420 1.854 22 38.875 13.825 22 0.025 0.018 22 0.013 0.013 22 0.125 0.048 22 0.548 0.045
Sweden 20 9.807 0.270 20 1.831 2.113 20 62.335 14.127 20 0.007 0.007 20 0.009 0.010 20 0.039 0.012 20 0.689 0.035
Switzerland 11 10.192 0.084 11 0.660 1.312 11 74.302 8.870 11 0.006 0.003 11 0.009 0.006 11 0.046 0.002 11 0.674 0.014
Taiwan 3 9.881 0.028 3 2.051 3.838 3 101.754 5.017 3 0.013 0.004 3 0.012 0.007 3 0.077 0.002 3 0.465 0.008
United Kingdom 22 9.708 0.321 22 2.339 1.795 22 44.674 8.330 22 0.013 0.018 22 0.013 0.013 22 0.029 0.008 22 0.675 0.037
United States 20 10.040 0.324 20 2.156 2.110 20 18.387 4.961 20 0.013 0.008 20 0.004 0.005 20 0.036 0.006 20 0.713 0.027
Venezuela 21 8.735 0.121 21 -1.107 5.073 21 35.620 6.191 21 0.037 0.015 21 0.009 0.008 21 0.138 0.024 21 0.623 0.036
Job Creation, Job Destruction and Job Turnover were calculated by the Authors based on ILO data, as described in the text. Data on per capita GDP, GDP growth and Trade Openness are from the Penn Tables version 6.2.
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Appendix Table A1 - Country-level Summary Statistics (Continued)
GDP growth Openness to Trade Job Creation Rate Job Destruction Rate
Countries with Unemployment Benefits Schemes in place Throughout the Period
Log of per-capita GDP